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Introduction
Redevelopment projects in densely populated Chinese cities are notonly restructuring urban space in physical terms but are also inter-vening in the everyday lives of local residents, families, and com-
munities. Such interventions may lead to involuntary resettlement, loss of
income, and rupture of informal economies, social networks, and commu-
nity ties. Along with problems associated with relocation and compensation,
residents have to deal with grief over the loss of homes and places imbued
with a sense of belonging, as well as concerns about the future and feelings
of uncertainty, powerlessness, and anger about the lack of information and
inability to participate in the process of redevelopment planning and im-
plementation. Particularly in neighbourhoods with historical flair and cul-
turally significant architecture, individual and collective memories are
closely interwoven with the history of the place.
This paper uses a micro-study of old town redevelopment in the southern
Chinese city of Guangzhou to illuminate the complex social dynamics of
urban reconstruction in detail, especially as processes of deconstructing and
reconstructing physical and imaginative spaces. It focuses on how residents
are affected by the project intervention, and what leeway they have to make
their ideas and demands heard. Are they concerned with material compen-
sation alone, or also with recognition of their own experiences, collective
memories, and views of life in their neighbourhood as well as with partici-
pating in reshaping the now contested urban space?  
In the tradition of analyses of social conflict that view contention not as
dysfunctional but rather as an expression of social change (Georg Simmel,
Ralf Dahrendorf, and Lewis Coser), the focus here is on conflicts of recognition
that arise within the process and that also continue to feed it. Primary at-
tention is paid to the perspectives of the residents, especially those who con-
tinue attempting to voice their side of the conflict, to discern and achieve
their rights, and to shape the renewal process to fit their own ideas of the
place. 
Based on my own participatory observation (2010-12), interviews with
residents, exhibitions, and media documentation, (1) this study examines the
social impact of a redevelopment project in Guangzhou’s old town, a neigh-
bourhood of cultural and historical interest. It also analyses how citizen ac-
tivism has developed in response. To better understand the dispute beyond
a simple matter of bargaining over economic compensation, it is structured
on a recognition-theoretical model of social conflict that builds on Axel
Honneth’s debate with Nancy Fraser over redistribution and recognition. (2)
I argue that social conflicts between residents and local governments arising
from urban redevelopment extend beyond the question of redistributing
material benefits and losses to trigger conflicts of recognition shaped by
coercion, bargaining, and asymmetrical participation in the authoritarian
yet highly commercialised process of transformation in China. While this
case study cannot claim to be representative, it can contribute to under-
standing the complexity and dynamics of social conflicts, social segregation,
and citizen activism arising from a social intervention in an inner-city neigh-
bourhood. 
Protest research and the question of
recognition
The pilot project for redeveloping an old town neighbourhood in
Guangzhou – which forms the basis for this study – extended over a period
of several years and was marked by protests and collective actions by res-
idents. Relevant points of study come from China-related protest research
starting in the 1990s under the paradigm of “rightful resistance.” (3) This
paradigm shaped the early debate on rural protests, which subsequently
also addressed urban protests on issues such as the environment and
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1. I visited the site ten times and participated in three group interviews with residents of several
hours each. I also participated in workshops, lectures, and an exhibition opening (December 2011)
focussing on the impact of the old town project. Unless otherwise indicated, all the information
is from oral or written Chinese sources. I thank Huang Yuan for helping with the social assessment
teaching project and the residents for their kindness and patience in explaining their views of the
project and its impact. 
2. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,
London, Verso, 2003.
3. Kevin J. O’Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 31-55; Kevin J. O’Brien and
Li Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; cri-
tique by Elizabeth Perry, “Chinese Conception of ‘Rights’: From Mencius to Mao – and Now,” Per-
spectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2008, pp. 37-50.
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labour. (4) Its focus has become more varied, including whether the protests
seek to implement already existing rights or extend to gaining the ability
to help formulate new legislation. (5) In both rural and urban conflicts, ex-
propriation (of land) and demolition of housing constitute primary motives
for resistance. Major means of protest include individual and written peti-
tions as well as attempts to mobilise delegates of the National People’s
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. (6) In
addition to the forms and extent of protest, scholarly debate shows a spe-
cial interest in whether they could endanger one-party rule in China and
ultimately lead to regime change. (7) Some authors consider protest itself
a form of participation. (8) After Sidney Tarrow pointed to a lack of research
on the relations between protest and policy response, this issue has at-
tracted greater attention. (9) With research on protest movements linked
to the paradigm of “resilient authoritarianism” from Andrew Nathan
(2003), (10) terms such as “contentious authoritarianism” or “consultative
authoritarianism” are employed to explore the many valences of protest
and participation within the realm of authoritarianism. (11) “Bargaining au-
thoritarianism” is used by Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang to cover
three practices of domination and subordination between grass-roots of-
ficials and protesting citizens, which they identify as micro-foundations of
authoritarian domination, namely protest bargaining, bureaucratic absorp-
tion, and patron-clientelism. Lee and Zhang argue that all three of these
tactics seek to depoliticise and commodify conflict. (12) As illuminating and
convincing as this analysis is, it nevertheless leaves open the extent to
which the practice consists of tactical calculation by officials seeking to
defuse any explosive political content, or whether these officials assume
the protests are in fact economically motivated and can therefore also be
solved by economic means. 
In the case study presented here, what gradually crystallised from my par-
ticipatory observation was that the main trigger for the conflicts was the
matter of recognition or the lack thereof, in the form of regard or disregard
for residents’ problems, desires, demands, knowledge, and living conditions
on the part of local planning and government offices. Conflicts of recogni-
tion are understood here in a broader context of social justice, redistribution,
and participation. Residents’ demands for recognition are differentiated in
terms of their economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions. Recogni-
tion is viewed as a normative category making individual autonomy de-
pendent on intersubjective agreement. (13) Building on Axel Honneth, I define
conflicts of recognition as social conflicts that arise from the individual or
collective experience of disregard, and the resistance arising from this ex-
perience as opening a form of expression that serves to affirm one’s own
moral or social value. (14) At the same time, this self-affirmation generates
recognition within the group of protesters, which in turn can be reinforced
by interaction with other social agents who support them. (15) Whereas
Fraser and Honneth refer explicitly to Western societies in their debate on
redistribution or recognition, I place this definition of conflicts of recognition
in the context of contemporary China marked by authoritarianism, market
relations, and societal transformation, and distinguish three patterns of
recognition, namely: 1) paternalist care/coercion and subordination where
the state with its concentration of resources is capable of sustaining and
stabilising authoritarian power in a reciprocal manner; 2) market-like ex-
change and distributive justice where market mechanisms are increasingly
influencing all spheres of Chinese society, including state-society and state-
market relations, and where ever more citizens know and are defending their
rights; 3) social differentiation/pluralisation and participation where rapid
social transformation is producing new social groups that need to find ways
of participating in decision-making processes regarding state, market, and
societal issues. These three patterns of recognition stand for different rela-
tionships of solidarity and figurations of identity. They form the authoritar-
ian/flexible framework in which conflicts of recognition are worked out in
Chinese society. (16) If subjects or groups feel that an agreed-upon pattern
of recognition is failing or violated, this feeling may underlie the experience
of “disrespect” and become the motivational basis for social conflicts. (17)
Before examining these nexuses more closely, I will describe the location
in Guangzhou, its historical and cultural background, and sketch the rede-
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4. Yu Jianrong, “Conflicts in the Countryside,” China Perspectives, No. 2007/3, pp. 28-34; Cai Yong-
shun, Collective Resistance in China. Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail, Stanford, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2010; Zhu Jiangang and Wang Chao, “Jiti xingdong de celüe yu wenhua kuangjia de
jiangou” (Tactics of collective action and the construction of a cultural framework), in Zhu Jiangang
(ed), Gonggong Shenghuo Pinglun. Shequ, Kongjian yu Xingdong (Public Life Review: Community,
Space, and Action), No. 1, Beijing, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2010, pp. 31-70; You-tien
Hsing and Ching Kwan Lee (eds), Reclaiming Chinese Society: The New Social Activism, London,
Routledge, 2010. 
5. Jiang Yihong, “Altering the Rules: Chinese Homeowners’ Participation in Policy Making,” Journal
of Current Chinese Affairs, No. 3, 2013, pp. 121-148.
6. Chen Xi, Social Protests and Contentious Authoritarianism in China, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2012; Carl F. Minzner, “Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,”
Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2006, pp. 103-179; Bettina Gransow, “Das
Petitionswesen in China – ein Instrument sozialer Gerechtigkeit?” (Petitioning in China – An In-
strument of Social Justice?) in Der Bürger im Staat. Die Volksrepublik China (The Citizen in the
State: The People’s Republic of China), No. 3/4, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden Würt-
temberg, 2008, pp. 236-242.
7. Günter Schucher highlights the tendency in recent protest research on authoritarian regimes to
view all kinds of protest as being directed against the regime, in Schucher, “Liberalisierung in Zeiten
der Instabilität: Spielräume unkonventioneller Partizipation im autoritären Regime der VR China”
(Liberalisation in Times of Instability: Margins of Unconventional Participation in Chinese Author-
itarianism), German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Papers, No. 103, June
2009.  
8. Yu Jianrong, “Social Conflict in Rural China Today: Observations and Analysis on Farmers’ Struggles
to Safeguard Their Rights,” Social Sciences in China, No. 3, 2005, pp. 125 ff.; Christian Göbel and
Lynette Ong, Social Unrest in China, Europe China Research and Advice Network 2012, p. 23,
www.euecran.eu/ (accessed on 2 November 2013). 
9. Sidney Tarrow, “Prologue: The New Contentious Politics in China: Poor and Blank or Rich and Com-
plex?”, in Kevin J. O’Brien (ed), Popular Protest in China, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press,
2008, p. 7; Cai Yongshun, “Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China,”
China Quarterly, No. 193 (March), 2008, pp. 24-42; Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang, “The
Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China,”
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 118, No. 6, 2013, pp. 1475-1508. 
10. Andrew Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003, pp. 6-17.
11. Chen Xi, Social Protests and Contentious Authoritarianism in China, op. cit.; He Baogang and Stig
Thogerson, “Giving the People a Voice? Experiments with Consultative Authoritarian Institutions
in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 66, 2010, pp. 675-692.
12. Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang, “The Power of Instability,” art. cit.
13. See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Ex-
change, op. cit., p. 1; Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution,
Recognition and Participation, in ibid. pp. 9-16. For the contested process of individualisation in
China see Mette Halskov Hansen and Rune Svarverud (eds), iChina: The Rise of the Individual in
Modern Chinese Society, Copenhagen, NIAS Press, 2010.
14. I do not, however, follow Axel Honneth’s approach of comprehending recognition as an overar-
ching moral category while treating distribution as a derivative. (Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, op. cit., pp. 2, 3).
15. Cf. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte (Fighting
for Recognition: A Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1994,
pp. 260, 263.
16. The structure of the book by You-tien Hsing and Ching Kwan Lee, Reclaiming Chinese Society,
op. cit., see p. 4, seems to be inspired by Nancy Fraser’s understanding of social recognition, but
You-tien Hsing and Ching Kwan Lee do not go into detail on this and do not take up Fraser’s ex-
plicit reference to Western societies. Laurence Roulleau-Berger has stated that demands for recog-
nition arise from situations of social, economic, and ethnic inequality and elaborates on the
emergence of intermediate spaces in Chinese society producing “grammars of recognition and
contempt.” Laurence Roulleau-Berger, “Multiple Modernities, Inequalities and Intermediate
Spaces,” in Laurence Roulleau-Berger and Li Peilin (eds), European and Chinese Sociologies: A New
Dialogue, Leiden, Brill 2012, p.88. 
17. Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser,” Redistribution or
Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, op. cit., p. 157.
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velopment project’s progression since 2007 and its planning and regulatory
framework.
Old town neighbourhood – flair of Xiguan
culture 
Like other Chinese cities, Guangzhou has undergone comprehensive re-
structuring. The associated intercity competition and entrepreneurial mu-
nicipal strategies have placed a priority on urban planning. (18) In this shift
toward the market, urban land reform has become the major fulcrum for
reshaping the spatial structure of the city. The introduction of market value
has accelerated the conversion of industrial and residential land to com-
mercial use. In addition, decentralisation of economic decision-making has
strengthened the role of municipalities in organising urban development.
New economic agents have appeared, and government regulations and
market forces are coalescing. (19) Along with entrepreneurial discourses,
Guangzhou is presenting itself as an economic and metropolitan centre and
a “world-class city” (shijie wenhua mingcheng 世界文化名城), and has re-
cently also been stressing its local cultural heritage as an asset. (20)
In the heart of the old town of Guangzhou, centrally located between a
busy pedestrian zone and a popular park and with excellent public trans-
portation, lies a former Cantonese opera neighbourhood and choice piece
of property in the eyes of entrepreneurial local governments, investors, and
real estate agents. Its southern border is formed by Xiguanlu Road, (21) which
gives the area and redevelopment project its name. Considered representa-
tive of local Xiguan culture (xiguan wenhua 西关文化), the arcades (qilou
骑楼) in the tall buildings lining Xiguanlu Road offer protection against sun
and rain, and are an inviting place to stroll with countless small businesses,
shops, and restaurants. The neighbourhood is also home to the historical
“Golden Voice” cinema, of which however only the facade still exists today. 
Xiguan (western suburb) was the name used in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries for what is currently part of the old town of Guangzhou
(or Canton as it was then called in the West). It was settled by foreign traders
and vendors who were not allowed to reside within the walled city itself. (22)
When the city became the only open port for foreigners in China in 1759,
Xiguan rapidly blossomed into a centre for trade. 
In contrast to the lively activity on the surrounding streets, Xiguanlu tends
to be a quiet and peaceful neighbourhood – at least before turning into a
demolition theme park. Paved with traditional slabs of granite (mashi 麻石),
its alleys are too narrow for vehicular traffic but are an appealing place to
chat with neighbours and view historical buildings from different eras. Dis-
tinctive tripartite doors in the Xiguan buildings (xiguan dawu 西关大屋) are
a common sight, consisting of a half-height, curved and often carved double
structure (jiaomen 脚门) on the outside, then a full-length barred gate (tan-
glong 趟栊) in the middle providing security but also letting in air and light,
and then a solid, heavy wooden door (damumen 大木门) on the inside.
With residents from different social backgrounds, numerous nearby shops
and facilities, a relatively high population density, and close neighbourly
contact, the Xiguanlu redevelopment area reflects in certain ways the ideal
of New Urbanism. (23) Noteworthy here is that metropolitan redevelopment
projects worldwide spend great effort countering societal segmentation in
order to achieve what was already present in Xiguanlu. Thus it might seem
ironic that a neighbourhood like Xiguanlu, which embodied numerous in-
tegrative factors and possessed a special historical flair, was suddenly struck
by the wrecking ball. Instead of using the neighbourhood’s strengths to
counter the threat of polarisation in urban society, the redevelopment proj-
ect itself now threatens to further this polarisation.  
Redevelopment as social intervention –
“Demolition before planning” 
The Xiguanlu redevelopment project was first mentioned in late 2006 as
one of five planned urban renewal projects in Guangzhou. Its total building
floor space is 20.71 hectares. Some 2.45 hectares were to be preserved on
account of their unique characteristics. (24) Some 14.14 hectares were sub-
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18. Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu, and Anthony Gar-On Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State,
Market and Space, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 180.
19. Ibid., pp. 233, 236.
20. Developing Guangzhou into a culturally rich world-class city was the topic of the 2010 Guangzhou
Summit Forum.
21. The actual name of the road, which is also used for the neighbourhood and the redevelopment proj-
ect, has been altered to “Xiguanlu” to preserve the privacy of the residents. “Lu” is Chinese for road.
22. Michael Tsin, Nation, Governance and Modernity in China: Canton 1900-1927, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1999, p. 20.
23. New Urbanism is a movement that arose in the USA in the late twentieth century to counter
urban sprawl. It seeks to integrate residential, working, and shopping spaces based on the model
of historical city centres. 
24. Exhibition brochure January 2012, 11 pages (in Chinese); Hyun Bang Shin, “Elite Vision Before People:
State Entrepreneurialism and the Limits of Participation,” in Uwe Altrock and Sonia Schoon (eds), Ma-
turing Megacities: The Pearl River Delta in Progressive Transformation, Dordrecht, Springer, 2014, p. 270.
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ject to demolition requiring permanent displacement of 1,950 households,
both those in public rental units managed by the municipality and those
owned privately. Besides the residents, key stakeholders in the project were
the municipal and district governments with their respective planning bu-
reaus and district branch offices, the resettlement office, the municipal land
resource and housing administrative bureau, and the land use and develop-
ment centre responsible for cash compensation and relocation costs. (25)
Redevelopment of Xiguanlu was initially approached under the motto of
“all buildings should be torn down” and “all residents can return to their
homes.” Whereas the second part of the motto was received positively by
residents, the first part was sharply criticised for claiming that historical build-
ings should not be protected and that even the famous Qilou buildings on
Xiguanlu Road should be replaced by new high rises. In 2007, the Guangzhou
municipal government backed down, the plan was revised, and the Qilou
buildings were supposed to be preserved – albeit only the architectural mon-
uments (wenwu 文物). With an international call for tenders the city then
sought a comprehensive draft plan for the area. In April of 2008, the
Guangzhou Municipal Planning Office approved a plan for protecting and
utilising historical architecture in the project area that was designated a “di-
lapidated housing redevelopment district.” One month later, homeowners
from Xiguanlu sent a letter to the National People’s Congress stating that
the planned demolition work would violate the Property Law (Wuquanfa 物
权法) of 2007 (26) and that the plan should be recalled or changed.
Despite this unresolved situation, demolition began in November 2008.
At this point 954 households, or fewer than half of those affected, had
signed a compensation agreement. (27) In December 2009, the local govern-
ment presented a plan for protecting and developing what was now called
a “historical and cultural district” (lishi wenhua jiequ 历史文化街区), em-
phasising culture, leisure, and tourism. The change expressed by this plan
becomes more understandable when one considers that Guangdong
Province and thus the city of Guangzhou were basing their planning efforts
on the “Three Olds” (sanjiu 三 旧 ) policy. (28) This document from the
province gave the green light for large-scale urban redevelopment, yet also
contained guidelines for greater public participation.
In August 2010, the mayor of Guangzhou visited the project area and
stated that it should become a model for improving lives, preserving culture,
and restoring the old town. In March 2011, the district government decided
to preserve 120 historical buildings, including former residences of Can-
tonese opera singers. In June 2011, the planning committee of the city of
Guangzhou passed a new redevelopment plan for Xiguanlu, (29) which was
finally published in January 2012. It stated that only an additional 50 house-
holds should be resettled, and emphasised a new motto that “all buildings
of historical and cultural value should be preserved” and “original residents
can retain their home ownership.” To be on the safe side, however, it stressed
to the press that “it will not be possible for all the residents to return.” (30)
This was nearly the exact opposite of the plan’s original motto from 2007.
Residents increasingly came to the conclusion that the plans for establishing
a Xiguan Old Town tourist area were in large part commercially motivated.
Their remaining hopes of returning to the neighbourhood were dashed with
the publication of this plan. 
As a critical conclusion, it remains a fact that the project was not con-
ceived to pursue overarching, well-considered, and comprehensible aims of
old town redevelopment. Instead, the city thereby secured valuable land as
a resource for commercial activities. As such, the project planning served
less as a guide for rational and ordered implementation than as an instru-
ment for removing a good number of residents from the area as quickly as
possible in order to begin tearing down the buildings. This created facts on
the ground that made it less attractive for the remaining residents to stick
it out amid the rubble, dirt, and ruins while dealing with noise, dust, de-
creasing safety, and numerous other problems. 
Of relevance here is that the “Regulations for Expropriation and Compen-
sation for Houses on State-Owned Land” (Guoyou tudi shang fangwu
zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli 国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例) of 2011 (31)
put a new legal basis into effect that replaced the regulation on demolition
and compulsory resettlement in effect since 2001. These new Expropriation
Regulations address citizen’s concerns much more than before, for example
by basing compensation on the market value of new flats. A draft of these
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25. For a detailed analysis of the various actors involved in urban redevelopment from a planning
perspective see (for Shanghai) Zhang Kai, “Who is Relocating Whom in the Renovation of Shang-
hai’s Old City?”, China Perspectives, No. 2013/1, pp. 29-39.
26. The Chinese Property Law defines all forms of property in the PR China and the associated rights:
state, collective, and private. It states that the creation, transfer, and destruction of immovable
property rights require registration. 
27. Hyun Bang Shin, “Elite Vision Before People,” art. cit., p. 274; Exhibition brochure, op. cit., p. 8.
28. Guangdong sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu tuijin “san jiu” gaizao cujin jieyue jiyue yongdi de ruo-
gan yijian (Some Suggestions of the People’s Government of Guangdong Province on Advancing
“Three Olds” Redevelopment and Promoting Land Conservation and Intensive Land Use) (2009).
The “Three Olds” policy (document No. 78) refers to old villages-in-the-city, industrial areas, and
residential districts and their redevelopment. Press conference on Guangzhou’s “Three-Olds Re-
development” program, 18 August 2010, www.gz.gov.cn/business/htmlfiles/gzgoven/s7467/20
1101/719458.html (accessed on 5 December 2013); see also Sonia Schoon, “Three Olds: Experi-
mental Urban Restructuring with Chinese Characteristics, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in Compari-
son,” in Uwe Altrock and Sonia Schoon (eds), Maturing Megacities, op. cit., pp. 105-121.
29. Wei Kai, “Jumin quanbu huiqian bu keneng” (It will not be possible for all the residents to return),
Nanfang dushibao, 21 September 2011.
30. Liu Xue, “[Xiguan] lu chaiqian zai yanqi” (Demolition of Xiguanlu extended again), Nanfang
dushibao, 25 June 2011, p. A06.
31. Promulgated by the State Council.
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2011 Expropriation Regulations had already been under discussion for sev-
eral years previously, although repeatedly delayed due to resistance by local
governments for whom the purchase of land had become a major source
of income. (32) The 2011 Expropriation Regulations assign a dominant role
to the government in expropriation and compensation, and prohibit agen-
cies such as real estate builders, developers, and demolition companies from
engaging in these activities. (33) If citizens do not accept expropriation deci-
sions, they have the right to apply for administrative reconsideration. These
new regulations also improve the standards and evaluation methods for
compensation as well as for settling disputes over unregistered buildings.
Disputes are to be settled before expropriation just as compensation is to
be provided before relocation. Moreover, the new regulations also address
low-income issues for the first time, expressing legislators’ concern for the
situation of socially disadvantaged groups. All in all, these new regulations
represent a considerable advance in protecting the rights of persons facing
expropriation and resettlement. Crucially, they lay out the conditions under
which expropriation may be undertaken in the public interest and also re-
quire greater transparency. The 2011 Expropriation Regulations are a clear
example of how new laws and directives came out after the start of the
Xiguanlu project, which – if consistently applied – would have improved
the situation for residents. 
For a project like this it would have been necessary to assess the potential
social impact and risks before the actual work began. Although there is no
Social Assessment Law in China corresponding to the Environmental As-
sessment Law of 2003, there do exist guidelines and recommendations
which could have been used to develop social action plans for those affected
– especially for vulnerable groups – with the aim of enabling appropriate
participation in the project’s benefits. (34) Despite their relative advancement
over earlier regulations, the Expropriation Regulations of 2011 are hardly
suitable for this purpose. Although they require a public hearing before ex-
propriation and also call for a “social stability risk evaluation report” (Shehui
wending fengxian pinggu baogao 社会稳定风险评估报告), this report fo-
cuses on the risks that protesting citizens might pose to smooth operations
and thus cause longer and more expensive projects as opposed to the social
risks and impact on those affected. The approach would thus appear to be
misguided, and in danger of achieving precisely the opposite results. In fact,
it creates incentives to raise the spectre of social unrest in order to make
use of funding to maintain social stability. 
Conflicts of recognition and citizen activism 
The conflicts faced by residents in the Xiguanlu neighbourhood have
changed in character, expanded, and become more varied since the start of
the demolition and relocation process. What started as largely a reaction
to resettlement and compensation measures has deepened into debate over
the local historical significance of the neighbourhood and into an array of
ideas about the future of both the neighbourhood and its residents. Over
the course of this process, different actors have become involved such as
experts, the media, and civil society, and also new and public means have
been used such as websites, lectures, workshops, films, music videos, and
exhibitions to provide information about Xiguanlu and thus to encourage
discussion of redevelopment and gentrification-related problems in old
town neighbourhoods. 
Protests by the residents of Xiguanlu and their contestation of space can
be analysed as conflicts of recognition in at least four different dimensions,
including: (1) an economic dimension focusing on the project’s criteria for
setting compensation levels, combined with demands for distributive jus-
tice; (2) a social dimension directed toward the recognition of neighbours’
“lived space” (Henri Lefebvre); (3) a cultural dimension with residents de-
manding preservation and restoration of local Xiguan culture; and (4) a po-
litical dimension revolving around disregard for the problems that
redevelopment has created for residents and their feelings of belonging,
views, and knowledge of the place. A key component here is the demand to
be accepted as partners in the negotiating process by the local authorities
and government with regard to the future of their own lives and that of
their neighbourhood.
Economic recognition: Protesting and negotiating
compensation standards
The idea of having to leave a familiar neighbourhood and relocate to an
outlying district was a challenge for many residents of the Xiguanlu neigh-
bourhood. At the start of the project in 2007, some 1,950 households were
to be resettled, of which 723 were renting from the city and 1,277 were
under private terms (both tenants and owners). Whereas the tenants in mu-
nicipally-owned spaces were obliged to move out without much ado as of
2008 and 2009, negotiations with tenants and owners under private agree-
ment were much more complicated. At issue were the conditions, standards,
and levels of compensation, but also and especially the unclear ownership
titles. In July 2009, some 634 households in privately-owned buildings had
not signed compensation agreements, including 136 households from weak
socioeconomic backgrounds. By March 2010 this number had declined
slightly to 563. The effects of the project in terms of entitlement to com-
pensation for the loss of their living space were very different for the various
groups of tenants and owners. (35)
“Tenants in publically owned flats” (gongfang zuhu 公房租户), many of
whom were themselves various types of civil servants, could either accept
the government’s arrangements and move into flats located mainly on
the outskirts of Guangzhou or find other housing themselves and receive
a subsidy of 1,600 yuan per square metre. In any case they had to move
out, and tenants of publically owned flats were the first to leave Xiguanlu.
They later complained about the poor quality of their new flats, high man-
agement fees, additional costs for public transportation, an absence of
markets, and broken familial networks. Particular difficulties were encoun-
tered by extended families who had had more space in the Xiguan build-
ings and could no longer accommodate all their members. Nevertheless,
the recognition pattern of paternalist care by the local government versus
subordination of the residents seems to have been generally operative in
N o . 2 0 1 4 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 21
32. Matthew Erie, “Property Rights, Legal Consciousness and the New Media in China: The Hard Case
of the ‘Toughest Nail-house in History’,” China Information, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2012, p. 51.
33. Yan Jun and Chen Haiting, “Understanding the Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation
of Housing on State-Owned Land,” China Bulletin, November 2011, www.kingandwood.com (ac-
cessed on 28 December 2013). Local governments were also prohibited from commissioning dem-
olition companies on their own. This was designed to reflect the basic legal principle that
administrative regulations are distinct from implementation and may not be used to determine
the latter.
34. See Touzi xiangmu kexingxing yanjiu zhinan (Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Study).
Approved by the State Planning and Development Commission of China, Beijing 2002; Bettina
Gransow and Susanna Price (eds, revised English version), Social Assessment Manual for Invest-
ment Projects in China – Turning Risks Into Opportunities, Compiled by China International Engi-
neering Consulting Corporation, Beijing, China Planning Press, 2007.
35. The following analysis of entitlement groups is based on “Jumin shou yingxiang qingkuang zongjie”
(Summary of the situation of [project] affected residents), 5 pages (2010).
Bettina Gransow – Reclaiming the Neighbourhood 
the case of tenants in publically owned flats moving to the outskirts of
the city. 
Other complaints over compensation had to do with living space that for
historical reasons had been administered only provisionally by the govern-
ment (daiguan fangzi 代管房子) and lacked the legal conditions for com-
pensation. Daiguan fangzi refers to residences whose lawful owners cannot
be determined and so are administered by the municipal housing depart-
ment. Compensation conditions are the same as for tenants in publically
owned flats. Some households, however, view themselves as owners instead
of tenants and are consequently dissatisfied. A second problem has to do
with “co-ownership” of flats that cannot be divided. Dissatisfaction is espe-
cially high here, because these individuals are denied recognition as owners
and view the fact of little or no compensation as unjust.
“Tenants in privately-owned flats” (sifang zuhu 私房租户) are the most
negatively affected. Rental contracts are the sole source of eligibility for
compensation. This especially affects long-time tenants and migrants. Long-
time tenants who had for example taken over flats from relatives a long
time ago but whose landlords could no longer be reached have difficulty
demonstrating their eligibility for compensation. Migrants as a specific
group of tenants in privately-owned flats who are permanently registered
at another location also lack a claim to compensation, even if they have
lived for a long period of time with their families in the project area. 
“Private homeowners” (sifang yezhu 私房业主) can choose between cash
compensation and exchanging their flat for another piece of real estate.
Two groups of private homeowners have to be distinguished: those of rel-
atively small flats and those of larger flats or houses. Low-income families
with only one flat smaller than 40 m² were eligible for compensation
based on a minimum size of 40 m2. (36) Because the standard unit was set
at 9,000 yuan/m2, owners could receive compensation of 360,000 yuan.
This could well enable them to purchase a flat of 70-80 m2 in a suburb
for somewhat more than 200,000 yuan and then have money left over.
Similar to tenants in publicly owned flats who had no means of resisting
relocation, the 400 households that owned only small flats had no way
to get around the “irresistible offer” in practical terms either. A generous
compensation offer meant that this group could be easily “bought out”
of the area. Here the dominant recognition pattern is a market-like ex-
change; but combined with the paternalist care/submission pattern this
group would have had practically no means of refusing financially attrac-
tive offers. 
Many of the remaining homeowners initially imagined that they would re-
turn to the area following redevelopment and “buy back in” (yuandi huiqian
原地回迁). But it quickly became apparent that the monetary compensation
on offer was not sufficient to do so. In a protest letter to the Standing Com-
mittee of the local People’s Congress (Guangzhou shi renmin daibiao dahui
changwu weiyuanhui 广州市人民代表大会常务委员会) dated 23 November
2009, a group of residents complained that “the cash compensation is too
low. Although it was said that the standard figure should be 9,000 yuan/m2
(reflecting the estimated market price + 20% old town allowance + buyer
subsidy of 1,200 yuan/m2 + bonus of 500 yuan/m2 for signing the contract
on time), in fact, however, often only 8,000 or even 7,000 yuan/m2 was paid.
This is not enough even for ‘second-hand’ flats, which are going for 10,000
yuan/m2, let alone first-occupancy flats with prices of 15,000-17,000
yuan/m2.” (37) The buy-back idea was therefore unfeasible for arithmetical
reasons alone. This was one of the main reasons why the compensation for
owner-occupied flats was deemed unjust (bu gongzheng 不公正). 
Criticism was also directed at the measurement of living space. Because
the individual storeys of the old Xiguan buildings are very high, the surface
area actually in use was two to three times the floor area itself, but only
the floor area was used for calculations. Owners of larger flats and houses
can be identified primarily with a market-like recognition pattern. If they
feel the pattern is violated, they do not hesitate to fight for a fair price.
“Shop owners and leaseholders” (ziyou shangpu he shangpu zuhu 自有商
铺和商铺租户). Private owners of flats who have set up shops (zhugaishang
住改商) – a situation first made possible by reform policy – cannot receive
compensation via the “shop for shop” method, nor can they return to their
shops following the completion of the renewal project. This affects most of
the shops in the Xiguanlu arcades, and the owners are very unhappy as a
consequence. In general the owners of small shops in the area complain
that business has worsened since redevelopment was announced and that
the situation is declining all the more as their neighbours move out. 
The entitlement to receive compensation and the type of compensation
itself, including its standards and level, are matters of huge importance to
the residents. The list of different types of entitlement reflects a social hi-
erarchy, the lowest rung of which consists of those with no recourse to com-
pensation whatsoever. Based on their position within the hierarchy,
individual households face different opportunities and risks that could mean
financial gain or conversely a worsening of their situation. 
Social recognition: Decrying the rupture of family
and residential networks
The Xiguanlu neighbourhood is a mesh of individual, family, organisational,
community, and business networks. Individual families as well as social
groups emphasised their dependence on social networks to greater or lesser
degrees. Older residents who have spent decades in the neighbourhood and
residents who have small shops are especially unwilling to leave. The social
hierarchy that arises from the recognition or non-recognition of economic
loss and its compensation or lack thereof as well as from the differing de-
grees of bargaining power appears grosso modo to stand in inverse relation
to the degree of dependence that these “compensation” groups have on so-
cial networks. On the lowest rung of the hierarchy are the rural-to-urban
migrants who live in Xiguanlu with their families or relatives and who work
or have small shops nearby. Because they have to rely on informal arrange-
ments in many areas of their lives, the economic loss and the higher cost
of living that they anticipate from having to leave Xiguanlu without com-
pensation are exacerbated by the destruction of their local networks. Here
there is a clear lack of arrangement for those who have no recognisable
legal right or claim to the place where they are living. Rural migrants, for
example, should receive an appropriate form of resettlement assistance if
they have lived in the project area prior to a cut-off date established by the
project authority. (38) The Expropriation Regulations of 2011 should be sup-
plemented by a clause that addresses the rights of migrants-in-the-city and
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protects them from the consequences of redevelopment projects and the
loss of their livelihoods. Because the paternalist recognition pattern does
not cover migrants-in-the-city and because civil society is not strong
enough to effectively advocate for their needs, migrants are driven further
to the margins of urban society.
Resettlement also unleashes stress in many families due to multiple si-
multaneous decisions that affect key parts of their members’ lives. This can
include splitting up households as a result of displacement. It can also affect
marriages, jobs, schooling, care for children, elderly, or ill family members,
and other areas as well. (39) Moreover, the range of community services on
offer drops dramatically when a redevelopment project progresses and or-
ganisational structures and networks dissolve or change accordingly. The
residents’ committee (juweihui 居委会), which used to be open to neigh-
bourhood concerns, is no longer viewed as a helpful partner but rather as
an organisation that unilaterally advances the redevelopment project and
advises residents to move away. There is also said to be no support from
the street office (jiedaoban 街道办), which by law should exercise a guiding
function over the now disappointing residents’ committee. At the same
time, new organisations have appeared, such as the demolition office
(chaiqian bangongshi 拆迁办公室), with which the residents tend to com-
municate only when unavoidable.
The rupture of family and neighbourhood networks contributes to frus-
tration, especially among the poor and elderly but also among homeowners.
As trust declined in both existing and newly arisen grass-roots organisations,
residents began to close ranks, work more closely together, and address their
concerns to higher levels. While problems caused by the redevelopment
project are left to society, political control and suppression of civil society
activities and organisations are producing a social vacuum and undermining
social cohesion. As such, the recognition pattern of pluralisation and par-
ticipation can take effect here only in very limited form.
Faced with a growing supremacy of powers favouring demolition and
spurred by increasing mistrust, the residents and particularly the home-
owners have become ever more active and united over time. Their activ-
ities also create opportunities and entry points for support on the part of
experts, the media, and student groups. Support – and thus also recogni-
tion – has been provided by committed young people who became inter-
ested in the planning processes, local history, residents, and their social
conditions and dynamics. By compiling background material, holding in-
terviews, making films and music videos, holding academic workshops
with international comparisons of redevelopment projects, inviting ex-
perts, and arranging exhibitions both large and small, they have done
much to document and respond to the redevelopment project from a
number of perspectives. (40)
Cultural recognition: Protecting the place and its
history
Fuelled initially by largely practical concerns about the preservation of
their homes, but later also with a broader understanding of local identity,
residents turned the changing trials of redevelopment “planning” into a
process of reflecting on local culture and cultural authenticity. Considera-
tions included preservation, relations between cultural and social history,
public interest in redevelopment in Xiguanlu, and their own responsibility
and ownership. In the process they realised their desire not only to stay but
also to apply their own ideas on how to recreate their neighbourhood. 
The Guangzhou planning authorities viewed Shanghai’s Xintiandi (上海新
天地) project as the model for redevelopment in Xiguanlu. (41) Xintiandi rep-
resents the introduction of modern consumerism and lifestyles in restored
Shikumen ( 石库门) houses, (42) which were reinvented as popular shopping
and leisure sites. Whereas the buildings were carefully preserved (at least
from outside), low and middle-income residents had to leave the area to
make way for local elites, expatriates, and tourists. (43)
The residents of Xiguanlu tend to be critical of this model. “We can’t learn
anything from Shanghai’s Xintiandi; we want our real Xiguan back” (bu neng
xue Shanghai Xintiandi, yao hui women zhenzheng de Xiguan 不能学上海
新天地，要回我们真正的西关). (44) Cultural authenticity cannot be achieved
if historical buildings remain only as empty “crab shells” (xieke 蟹壳), they
say. The “Golden Voice” cinema in Xiguanlu Road, built in 1934, is cited as
a negative example; despite vehement warnings and protests, it was reduced
to a facade, and its unique acoustics are now irretrievably lost. The law on
intangible cultural heritage (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wenwu baohufa
中华人民共和国文物保护法, 2007) and the “Three Olds” policy (2009) fu-
elled their discussions. Groups met over early-morning tea to discuss not
only the preservation of historical buildings and their architectural aesthetics
but also their practical use and related questions of a living transfer of cul-
ture. In January 2012, the Guangzhou urban planning office published a
“Guangzhou Municipal Plan to Preserve Cultural-Historical Cities”
(Guangzhou shi lishi wenhua mingcheng baohu guihua 广州市历史文化名
城保护规划) and called for public response within 30 days. Shortly before
the deadline, 78 neighbours from Xiguanlu proposed that in addition to the
22 existing “cultural-historical neighbourhoods” in Guangzhou, the Xiguanlu
neighbourhood should be recognised as the 23rd on this list, emphasising
the former residences of Cantonese Opera stars, a guild hall for opera en-
sembles, and a school of martial arts. (45) Their proposal was accepted. It rep-
resented a success for the neighbourhood’s activists – but also a success
for the planners and local government, who despite all the preceding plan-
ning mishaps could now bask in having fulfilled in exemplary manner the
latest guidelines on preserving historical buildings and ensuring public par-
ticipation.
Political recognition: Demanding public participation
The first collective action by residents came in November 2009, after
demolition of a building caused a neighbouring building to lean dangerously.
Fearing that their safety was no longer ensured, 50 neighbours wrote a letter
to the Guangzhou municipal government, and then to the petition office
of the city’s People’s Congress demanding that construction work not be
started until residents were relocated (xian anzhi hou chaiqian 先安着后拆
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迁), and that higher compensation be paid to allow for the purchase of com-
parable living space. (46)
In January 2010 a “new style” district plan was presented, which divided
the project area into six operational areas, all of which were commercially
oriented. Residents were outraged that their neighbourhood would be fur-
ther ruined without a precise plan or legal basis. They wrote another protest
letter with 220 signatures containing proposals for improvement such as
monitoring the project for its social effects, holding a hearing to air the
views of experts, scholars, and the public at large, postponing demolition
until publication of an official plan, following the rules for preserving his-
torical neighbourhoods, and proceeding with redevelopment in accordance
with the principles of law and the protection of ownership. (47) Whilst these
various petitions did receive written replies, the replies continued to consist
largely of conveying the positions of the planning and administrative of-
fices.
Despite their numerous activities, residents emphasise that these were
apolitical in nature. “Indeed, why did we do all these things? We didn’t just
want to air our grievances (wuli qunao 无理取闹) … but we’d like to live
our lives, drink tea, and chat with the neighbours, maintain the Xiguan style
of life. We’re not against urban development! It’s just that it has to be based
on laws and regulations that take account of people’s lives, like finding a
new place first and then tearing things down.” (48) Talks and interviews fre-
quently produced comments like “the government really doesn’t listen to
us” (shishi shang, zhengfu bu kenting womende 事实上, 政府不肯听我们
的), or “our voice is not loud enough” (womende shengyin xianzai tai xiao
我们的声音现在太小). (49)
The inadequacy of the planning process was due in part to insufficient in-
formation, transparency, and involvement by citizens. It was not until the
Expropriation Regulations of 2011 that the legal foundations were laid for
public hearings to be held before compensation plans are finalised. More
extensive forms of participation would have been conceivable, however,
such as stakeholder workshops, or participation in action plans by margin-
alised groups. Many legal procedural issues could also be considerably im-
proved. In general, the procedural requirements for citizen participation are
vague, public hearings can be manipulated, and there is insufficient repre-
sentation or other means to achieve clearly defined results. (50)
The homeowners have been especially active in making use of participa-
tory opportunities, such that some researchers have compared them to in-
terest or lobby groups. (51) If they succeed in remaining in the neighbourhood
with their homes and putting their idea of “soft” urban renewal into practice,
they will be among the small number of residents who can count them-
selves winners.
The asymmetrical property and power structures that were present be-
forehand but were concealed by the integrative functions of neighbourhood
networks and facilities have broken through under the pressure of the re-
development intervention and are clearly evident in individual groups’ dif-
ferent levels of bargaining power. Social inequality has been turned inside
out, so to speak, and made manifest spatially as social segregation.
Conclusion
Social differences and unequal property relations existing in the neigh-
bourhood before the project began were less evident and were also miti-
gated by the effects of family and community networks. The assignment of
individual households to different entitlement groups for compensation,
which could be like winning a lottery ticket or incurring a steep loss, exerts
considerable leverage with respect to social hierarchies and polarisation and
is also reflected spatially in relocation. This means that most residents have
had to leave the popular neighbourhood. Of the fewer than 25% still living
in the project area in 2013, the majority are too poor and/or old to move,
have unclear ownership and compensation conditions, or are among the
few homeowners who have succeeded in remaining.
Analysing protests and debates about the old town redevelopment project
in the form of residents’ conflicts of recognition vis-à-vis local government
and its administrative offices reveals the dynamic character of these con-
flicts, which assume economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions and
are played out in the course of disputes over compensation, the loss of fam-
ily and neighbourhood networks, the preservation of historical buildings,
and the lack of opportunities to participate in planning and implementing
the project. This analysis shows how the conflicts can intensify, dissolve, or
become more ordered with changes in legal or economic framework con-
ditions; in any event such changes in the rules of the game place the points
of dispute on a new basis, which in turn can be recognised (or disputed) by
the parties in conflict. This applies especially to new laws and regulations,
in particular to those regarding property rights (2007), preserving cultural
heritage (2007), and house expropriation and compensation, including the
conditions for participation (2011) that all went into effect after project
work had begun, and thus unleashed dispute over their applicability to the
project already underway. Rapidly rising prices for real estate led to earlier
compensation offers no longer being viewed as appropriate. This dynamic
also appeared in disputes over the area’s cultural and historical significance.
As the residents – in the face of loss – became aware of not only their neigh-
bourhood’s architectural appeal and historical flair but also the close con-
nection between the local architecture, including its cultural and historical
traditions and their own Xiguan lifestyle in the quiet alleyways surrounded
by lively commercial roads in the centre of Guangzhou, they started to work
for a soft form of redevelopment in order to save what they still could of
the semi-demolished area. 
Of those involved in collective action against the form taken by the rede-
velopment project, owners of larger flats or houses are represented more
strongly than people of lower social classes, who have generally been hit
by the project in far more existential ways. In other words, those who have
suffered the greatest consequences of the redevelopment project are gen-
erally not those who are most active in opposing its negative effects. Al-
though improved integration of rural-to-urban migrants is a declared aim
of Chinese urbanisation policy, this new social group that has arisen in the
course of social transformation in the country – along with the new group
of urban middle-class homeowners – has been completely ignored in the
Xiguanlu project. The paternalist recognition pattern has shown itself to be
particulate, and does not cover migrants-in-the-city, who have to find new
living space and possibly also new jobs on their own. Although they are es-
pecially negatively affected, they were not involved in any protest actions
in Xiguanlu. One might speculate whether this is due primarily to their low
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number in the neighbourhood and their insufficient bargaining power, or to
a self-image founded less on their living conditions in the city and more on
their status as workers (given the otherwise numerous strikes and collective
actions by migrant workers), or quite simply to the hukou system, which
has led to migrants as non-hukou holders not making any claims on urban
spaces. Regarding citizen activism within this case study, no direct correla-
tion can be drawn between the degree of affectedness by the redevelop-
ment project and the degree of participation in collective activism on the
part of individual social groups. This hypothesis should be tested in the
course of further empirical studies. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that residents’ demands for recognition and
participation in shaping the outcomes of the redevelopment project clearly
showed the limits of the “demolition before planning” approach taken by
the project management, which was not based on clear procedural regula-
tions but instead consisted of reaching agreements on disputed matters one-
by-one with the individual households. Whilst this type of bargaining can
often achieve rapid solutions, it also carries the risk of undesirable side effects
that can be very costly. By contrast, greater participation before and during
such projects in the form of timely information, counselling, and involvement
by both residents and the public at large would make solutions considerably
more sustainable and probably also less expensive. In many cases, greater
investment in socially sustainable project planning and implementation can
surely prevent subsequent expenses “to maintain social stability.”
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